Chokepoint leverage looks permanent right up to the moment it isn’t. That’s the pattern across a century of resource coercion, and it applies to China’s position in rare earth processing exactly as it applied to everyone who held a similar position before. The mechanics are consistent. A state controls a stage of production that everyone needs and nobody can replace quickly. It uses that control, either openly or through licensing friction.

China held $1.04 trillion in U.S. Treasury securities as of December 2021. By December 2025, that position had declined to $683.5 billion — a reduction of roughly $357 billion, or 34%, over four years. China remains the third-largest foreign holder of U.S. federal debt, but its share of total foreign holdings fell from 13.4% to 7.4% over the same period. The trajectory is unambiguous and sustained. The decline has been both nominal and relative.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine did something to European identity that decades of integration summits could not: it made the identity felt. Geopolitical pressure is, historically, the most reliable accelerant of collective identity formation. Europe had been drifting toward comfortable ambiguity about what it stood for. Russia’s decision to wage a full-scale territorial war on a European neighbor clarified the question with brutal efficiency. The response was not uniform. Hungary maintained its equivocal position, demonstrating that the pressure was not absolute.

A system does not collapse the moment it is attacked from the outside. It collapses when it can no longer agree with itself on how to survive. What is now emerging inside Iran looks dangerously close to that threshold. Reports from Iran International describe a deepening confrontation between Masoud Pezeshkian and Ahmad Vahidi over the conduct of the war and its economic consequences. According to sources, the president has openly warned that without a ceasefire, Iran’s economy could collapse within weeks—three to four at most.